Wednesday, August 18, 2004


A few Papers

Hi again everyone. I have some papers I would like to direct some readers too. Be forewarned, they will probably only be of interest to the econ set. Also note, I am not prepared at this time to offer any substantive critique of the papers. I have given them only a cursory read and while I would like to sit down and deal with them in a more thoughtful manner, I doubt it will be anytime in the near future as I am still getting things under control at work. As a result, I figure it is best to just go ahead and direct others to the papers so they can draw their own conclusion.

The first is on what actually is a bad reputation?

Abstract: In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is "bad." We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the "Stackelberg type" used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.

Next, working for the government I found this paper interesting, and it puts the government Bureaucrat in a more favorable light than is usually the case.

Here is a paper on the economics of bottle deposits. I had to deal with this issue recently so I found it interesting, though I'm not sure if the2nd best allocation isn't better than the alternative proposed. This is one of those that requires deeper consideration.

"Selling Reputation when going out of business" suggests that reputation is really a tradeable commodity. On a related note, I have often viewed friends as a signaling mechanism, and thus what I would like to see is a paper on reputation as a transitive trait.

Okay, it is extremely late and I have to work hard tomorrow, technically today, so I will type some more later.


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